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Yvan Droz & Yonatan N. Gez
Translated by Ellen Kibble, Francesca I. Kleine & Claire Hefty
Introduction
Although Kenya is often considered a Christian country, a Kenyan journalist 
asserted in 2013 that, “if an opinion poll was conducted to establish how 
many citizens regularly go to places of worship, the results would frighten 
the clergy to death. If the researchers were to probe deeper, it might 
emerge that going to heaven is hardly the reason the few who visit places 
of worship (to ogle at gorgeous choir members) go there in the first place.” 
Despite these cynical remarks, several surveys underline the importance of 
religion for Kenyans. One study by Afrobarometer indicates that 88% of the 
country’s citizens (85% of men and 90% of women) consider religion to be 
very important in their lives (Afrobarometer 20111). Another survey shows 
that 80% claim to attend church at least once a week, while 64% participate 
in religious groups every week (Pew Research Center 2006). In both studies, 
Kenyans’ religiosity ranked highest among the ten countries surveyed.2
This chapter opens with a historical overview of Christianity in Kenya.3 
It then discusses recent transformations in the field of religion, before 
examining the political role of churches in Kenya. Finally, we describe 
certain religious practices and show that they are not confined to single 
religious institutions but instead involve  butinage  or “church hopping.” 
Such practices are present in various religious forms, and are as much part 
of Kenyans’ everyday life as they are of their lifelong religious trajectories.
1. The question asked was, “How important is religion in your life?” (question 
98B), and possible options included: “Not at all important”; “Not very important”; 
“Somewhat important”; “Very important”; and “Refused to answer.”
2. The countries that participated in the second survey were the United States, 
Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, parts of India, the 
Philippines, and South Korea.
3. We have limited our scope to Christianity. According to the 2009 census, 
Christianity accounts for 82.6% of the population. Historian John Lonsdale 
claims, evoking “educated ‘guesstimates’,” that 80% of Kenyans were Christian, 
7.3% Muslim, and 11.55% “traditionalists” (Lonsdale 2009, 63). For consideration 
of Islam in Kenya, read Michel Adam’s chapter in this volume, as well as Adam 
(2010) and Herzig (2006).
Yvan Droz & Yonatan N. Gez
286
1. Christian Religions in Kenya
Three branches of Christianity have played an important role in the 
evangelisation of central Kenya: Catholicism, Protestantism, and 
Anglicanism.4 Though this division into three branches poses little problem 
for the Catholics and the Anglicans—the latter being united under the Church 
of the Province of Kenya (CPK)5—the considerable diversity encompassed 
under the label of “Protestant” makes things less straightforward for the 
third branch.
Likely the “most important institution” in the country, the Catholic 
Church remains a significant power in Kenya. The Church’s social 
engagement—such as parish activities, teaching, and especially healthcare—
has contributed greatly to the Church’s success in Kenya. This appeal 
continues to this day, even though Catholic schools were not considered to 
be among the best in the country during the colonial period. Additionally, 
the Church Fathers’ nationalities (French and Italian) allowed them to adopt 
a position relatively independent from the British colonial government 
while forcing them to take extreme political caution. This particular 
feature of Catholicism stood in stark contrast to the stance taken by 
Protestants and Anglicans, who were tempted by political compromise and 
were always suspected of supporting the colonisers. The almost marginal 
political position of Catholicism within a colony of Anglican obedience 
did not go unnoticed by future converts, who were often more eager to 
embrace the “religion of the ‘more powerful,’ of those who call the shots, 
who control the situation and thereby demonstrate their superior strength” 
(Neckebrouck 1978, 472-473). Today, Catholicism seems to resist the 
significant loss of followers suffered by other religious groups following 
the meteoric rise of Pentecostalism.6 The explanation for this stability lies 
not only in the prudent restraint and relative lack of scandals embroiling 
the Catholic hierarchy, but also in the involvement of Catholic missionaries 
on the ground,—as well as papal prestige. Protestant puritanism influenced 
by the East African Revival (which we shall discuss later), however, regards 
Catholicism as a superficial religion, and suspects it of compromising with 
traditional religious practices. Some even consider Catholicism to be a 
cover for “satanic” activities.
4. We were inspired here by Droz (2004), which we have thoroughly revised and 
updated. 
5. Since renamed the Anglican Church of Kenya (ACK).
6. According to the 2009 national census, the Kenyan Catholic Church has close 
to 10 million followers.
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A former church of the British state, the Church of the Province of Kenya 
(CPK7) was long seen as the church of the colonisers, and was suspected of 
complicity with the colonial administration. It is true that the role held by 
this branch of Christianity throughout the Mau Mau War (1952–1956) left 
painful scars. Indeed, the Anglican and the Evangelical Churches supported 
the British army in the “rehabilitation” of the Mau Mau prisoners.8 Today, 
the CPK remains associated with conservative currents, even though 
it adopts—together with the Presbyterian Church, PCEA—a very critical 
outlook on Kenyan politics.9
Other historic Protestant churches make up nearly a third of Christians 
in Kenya. The largest among them remains the Presbyterian Church of 
East Africa (PCEA). Unlike Anglicans and Catholics, and despite some 
exceptions, Presbyterians consider the consumption of tobacco and alcohol 
as sinful. This prohibition demonstrates the strictness of faith taught by 
the Presbyterian Church—and, as we will see, by the Pentecostalists as 
well—and explains why these denominations perceive Catholicism as a lax 
religion.
2. The Independent African Churches  
in the Wave of Pentecostalism
As in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, missionary churches—particularly 
Anglican churches, and especially Protestant ones—were subject to schisms 
that led to the establishment of independent churches. In Kenya, this resulted 
from clashes concerning clitoridectomy and the quality of education (1928–
38),10 in which the Anglican and Catholic churches supported a moderate 
position. The diverse movement towards religious independence, equally 
7. According to some estimations, the Anglican Church represented almost 
10.6% of the population in 2007 (Kagema 2008). This is a significant increase, 
as statistics presented by David Barrett from the early 1980s indicate that 
only 7.2% of the population followed this denomination (Barrett 1982). In the 
latest censuses (2009, 2019), the Anglican Church was integrated into the larger 
category of “Protestants.”
8. The British put into place an anti-insurrectional strategy inspired by their 
then-recent experience in Malaysia in order to “bring back” and “rehabilitate” 
the Mau Mau prisoners. The prisoners passed through a series of camps where 
Protestant preachers would play an infamous role (Elkin 2005; Maloba 1993).
9. Benson (1995, 195); For a detailed account of Anglicanism in Kenya, see Bowen 
(2016).
10. The attempt to forbid clitoridectomy in Kikuyu territory was met with fierce 
resistance that inspired Kikuyus to found the independent schools movement as 
well as numerous independent Christian churches (Murray 1974; Sandgren 1989; 
Strayer 1978).
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motivated by colonial racism and political activism, coincided with the East 
African Revival (1936–38), which originated in Rwanda.11 Terence Ranger 
interprets the emergence of the East African Revival as a reaction from 
missionary churches which experienced a considerable loss of followers 
who left to join the independent churches (Ranger 1986, 35). This is true 
for central Kenya, where the East African Revival offered an alternative to 
the independent churches. Pentecostalism and independent churches were 
therefore two sides of the same coin, with both taking a new perspective on 
conversion and, more generally, on social mobility with a view to achieve 
personal fulfilment (Droz 1999).
Indeed, the commonalities between these two religious traditions are 
not confined to the motivations people have for converting to them, but 
can also be found in numerous doctrinal similarities, and in the emphasis 
placed on an expression of faith, both emotionally and institutionally 
(congregationalism). Even if certain “pagan” aspects seem to characterise 
independent churches, they often follow the same organisational framework, 
such as with regard to parish independence or the active participation of 
the congregation in religious services.12 Moreover, these factions were 
historically developed in unison until the country’s independence. In the 
1920s and 1930s, Pentecostalism was confined to restricted social circles, 
often composed of settlers. That Pentecostalism emerged from (first wave) 
“white” North American fundamentalist groups, and was distinguishable 
from (second wave) “black” American Pentecostalism (Hollenweger 1999). 
With the arrival of the East African Revival, the Pentecostal movement 
took off:
“placing an emphasis more on the experience of converting than on religious 
instruction, [the East African Revival] made itself more accessible to illiterate 
or poorly educated believers. In addition, its hymns […] gained great popularity 
and are often integrated into the ceremonies of other Churches. The third factor 
in its success is due to the fact that the East African Revival took a decisive 
stance on lay people (and notably on women), who are freely elected to lead 
the group. This denomination soon developed affinities with the Pentecostals 
[…]” (Maupeu 1998).
A second period in the development of Kenyan Pentecostalism can be 
distinguished, beginning in the 1960s, when the independent churches 
seemed to experience an equally significant growth following the end of 
the Mau Mau War. This phase was characterised by the arrival of foreign 
preachers, most of whom came from North and South America. As 
demonstrated by the flourishing of the Assemblies of God, these groups 
11. The East African Revival was a movement of Protestant revivalism that 
grew rapidly in neighbouring countries (Peterson 2012).
12. Personal correspondence by Hervé Maupeu, 24 December 1999.
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found Kenya to be a fertile ground. During this time, the number of 
Pentecostal churches in Kenya exploded, as did the number of Protestant 
missionaries, many of whom were Pentecostal or Evangelical. More 
recently, the wave of conversion to neo-Pentecostalism13 reached Kenya, 
along with the rest of Africa. The first conversions took place in the early 
1980s, and the numbers have been rising ever since. This third wave of 
Pentecostalism constitutes an important sociological phenomenon that 
is transforming religious affinities.14 It came at a time when Kenya faced 
major political and social upheavals—marked by the democratisation and 
the liberalisation of the political, economic, and religious markets. The 
process of registering a new denomination has been greatly simplified, 
thereby eliciting an explosion in the number of recognised churches.15
The new Pentecostal missionaries have profoundly transformed 
Christianity in Kenya.16 They offer a charismatic liturgy that underlines the 
importance of being “born again,”17 and they often emphasise the theology 
of prosperity. It is important to note that the Born-Again conversion process 
should not be understood as a phenomenon implicating the entirety of 
one’s beliefs, but rather as a social practice involved in the construction 
of multiple identities which prevail in Kenya (Droz 2002). Usually, the new 
converts would keep their previous religious affiliation after becoming born 
again, adding a new layer to their multifaceted identity (ethnic, religious, 
political, socio-economic, etc.) as they reposition themselves within new 
social networks. Conversions reinforce the social fabric of Pentecostalists, 
as “Jesus is the object of one’s commitment, but the commitment only 
13. For a description of neo-Pentecostalism, see Rey (2018) and Anderson (2004). 
(Neo-)Pentecostalism is an umbrella term for a number of movements that are so 
different that it is difficult to categorise them under any sort of common label 
(Anderson 2010).
14. At the end of the twentieth century, there were 126 million Pentecostalists 
in Africa, making up nearly 11% of the population of the continent. The majority 
converted after 1980 (Barrett 2001, 287).
15. In 2007, the Attorney General of Kenya, Amos Wako, asserted that there 
were 8,520 recognised churches in Kenya and 6,740 requests for recognition, 
with around 60 arriving each month (Ndegwa, Alex. 2007. “Over 6,000 Churches 
Awaiting Registration.” The Standard, 4 September).
16. As John Lonsdale has stressed: “in the 1990s Kenya had 1,300 of them 
[Evangelical missionaries], an astounding figure, twice as many as any other 
African country, and a second missionisation none would have foretold in 
1963” (Lonsdale 2002, 184). According to Paul Gifford, the number of foreign 
missionaries in Kenya was even higher (Gifford 1994, 519). In 1989, there were 
1,225 American protestant missionaries; in 1993, they were 1,337 (out of a total 
1,150 missionaries of all nationalities in 1978, 1,850 in 1986, and 2,321 in 1993).
17. Born again are Christians who have accepted a second baptism by immersion.
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becomes apparent in social relationships” (Englund 2007, 485). Nevertheless, 
a person’s conversion can also weaken their prior social relations, as some 
converts break former solidarities, or give up on participating in family 
ceremonies henceforth considered as “pagan.”
Today we are seeing a rapprochement between Pentecostalism and 
Evangelical Protestantism, a shift that has enabled a certain fluidity between 
independent and Pentecostal churches. Followers are able to alternate 
between events organised by different denominations with relative ease, 
as we will see below. At the same time, multiple denominations may 
come together to collaborate around public Christian “crusades.” Some 
international evangelists draw enormous crowds to their Pentecostal 
rallies at Nairobi’s Uhuru Park, and these performances that showcase 
masterful technical skills (Gifford 1987; 1992; Samita 2004). In addition, 
American televangelists such as Joel Osteen, Joyce Meyer, and T.D. Jakes 
attract numerous followers who watch their television programmes or read 
their books.18 Some of them are accused of “stealing” congregants from 
small independent churches or of subverting their structures in order to 
“prove” the value of their own evangelist work to their believers in Europe, 
South Africa, Nigeria, and especially North America. This frenzied quest 
for followers is further reinforcing the divisions inherent in Pentecostal 
and independent churches.19 Ever so often, minor leaders in one church 
allow themselves to be tempted by the seductive prospect of founding a 
new denomination, thereby seeing their name inscribed into the annals of 
Christianity.
These preachers proselytise in the markets, and announce the end of 
the world, or the imminence of the reign of God, or sometimes the Second 
Coming.20 They testify to the imminent power of God, promise healings or 
economic successes, and urge the audience to offer public confessions, so 
18. The commitment of these famous evangelists and their congregations in 
Kenya is not limited to the dissemination of sermons and the occasional crusade, 
and many Kenyans are regular beneficiaries of evangelistic and development 
programs funded and led by them. That said, their self-assessment of their work 
in Kenya is sometimes exaggerated, as we saw in 2013, when the North American 
evangelist T.D. Jakes was forced to apologise after overestimating the extent of 
the donations made by his church. He said, “the natives all over Kenya drink 
water because of this ministry. And the hospital in Nairobi survives because 
of this ministry.” Karanja, Antony. 2013. “US Pastor TD Jakes Apologises over 
Kenya Comments.” Daily Nation Online, 18 October. https://nation.africa/kenya/
news/us-pastor-td-jakes-apologises-over-kenya-comments-905700 [archive].
19. We recall that these fissures are not new, and that they have studded the 
history of Christianity in Kenya, and elsewhere (Neckebrouck 1983).
20. An era promised to the Righteous, after the second coming of Christ, 
according to the Apocalypse (20: 16).
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that they may be to be “saved” by receiving baptism by the Holy Spirit. Like 
pre-colonial African prophets, some predict future events or “explain”—
armed with biblical passages—extraordinary accidents or natural disasters.
Additionally, many of these Pentecostal preachers seek to carry out all 
of the signs indicated in the Bible to hasten the Second Coming of the 
Messiah (Droz 2001). This atmosphere of exalted expectation of the Second 
Coming is equally expressed in the numerous Pentecostal publications 
sold in the streets, outside the religious services of many provocatively 
named Pentecostal churches: Maximum Miracle Centre, Universal Church 
of the Kingdom of God, Jesus Is Alive Ministries, Glory of Christ Ministry, 
Power of Jesus Around the World, and so on. These publications announce 
upcoming “crusades” and peddle signs for the end of times: The Antichrist 
lives among us and tempts the faithful by the means of false prophets; the 
“Y2K bug” proved that the power of God remains superior to the miraculous 
technologies of Man; the Mark of the Beast is concealed in barcodes, revealed 
to those who inspect closely and, through numerological calculations, 
identify the infamous 666; dead children are revived after the laying on 
of hands by valiant preachers; the 1998 attack on the American embassy 
in Nairobi was an attempt by Satan’s supporters to weaken the soldiers 
of Christ; the inauguration of a Hindu temple in Nairobi is a worrying 
sign of the power of idolaters (Séraphin 2003). In short, there are many 
Kenyans who live in a world re-enchanted by the apocalyptic teachings of 
Pentecostal movements.
The certainty of bearing witness to the millennium quickly leads 
to performative social practices, as they can be akin to self-fulfilling 
prophecies. The millennium thus takes a prosaic form, with the faithful 
hoping to see non-believers punished so that they themselves might enjoy 
the very concrete fruits promised to the faithful disciples of this exacting 
faith. In other words, such Pentecostals live in a (re-)enchanted world 
where the hand of God (as well as that of Satan) is omnipresent and where 
miracles and sinful temptations co-exist in daily life. They believe that the 
times they are living correspond to the early days described in the Bible, 
those following the birth of Christ, and when the effusion of the Holy Spirit 
embraced the apostles.
In recent years, we have seen these spiritual ideas give way to ambitious 
plans to transform Kenyan society. Many Pentecostal movements have 
abandoned their reticence of “worldliness,” and openly engage in politics 
to promote a programme that some have qualified as “politics of the spirit” 
(Marshall 2009; Steigenga 2001; Villafañe 1996; Yong 2010). They maintain 
that their religious ideals could surpass earthly woes and promote a 
moralisation of political life, such as through the rejection of corruption, 
adherence to Christian values, etc. This new political involvement, which 
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is informed by a clear division between good and evil, could be considered 
as a form of pentecostalisation of the public sphere, which would clean up 
Kenyan politics and to bring morals back to political life (Parsitau 2008).
Despite such ambitions for society in general, a large part of Pentecostal 
entrepreneurship manifests itself in the opening of small denominations 
(often micro-denominations) that start off with grandiose ambitions, but 
ultimately remain active only locally. As Paul Gifford notes, Pentecostalism 
has seen the emergence of a “new class of religious professionals, that is to 
say the founders/owners/religious leaders” (Gifford 2009, 154; Gez & Droz 
2021). Unlike the priests of historic churches, these entrepreneurs do not 
enjoy the support of a recognised church platform, nor do they possess 
formal theological training. As Ruth Marshall points out with regards 
to Nigerian Pentecostalism, “While various forms of institutionalised 
accreditation exist, pastoral authority is represented as inhering in a 
personal call from God; anybody with a vision can start a church, a 
fellowship, or a mission, and they do” (Marshall 2009, 12; see also Corten & 
Marshall-Fratani 2001, 5). In Kenya, Pentecostal churches are so numerous 
that the national office cannot keep up with the rate of applications, even as 
the majority of churches probably do not seek official registration.
The arrival on the religious scene of these new entrepreneurs with no 
theological training has thrown into question the separation between social, 
political, economic and religious aspects of life; so much so that it is often 
said that “religion has become just like a business.” Founding a religious 
movement is therefore often considered to be a means of building up a 
political clientele and satisfying preachers’ thirst for power.21 In the eyes of 
many, Kenyan Pentecostals have lost their moral credentials in recent years 
due to repeated financial and sexual scandals (Gez & Droz 2015). Some 
people feel that the political projects of the Pentecostal movement do not 
represent a viable alternative to the current political system, but are simply 
a means for leaders to insert themselves into it. Consequently, Pentecostals 
are considered to be “among the most enterprising entrepreneurs of the 
21. The case of the Pentecostal bishop Margaret Wanjiru of the Jesus is Alive 
Ministries (JIAM) is edifying. She was elected to Parliament in 2007 for 
the ODM in the Starehe Constituency, but then lost her seat in 2013. Despite 
largely mobilising her followers through her sermons, the scandals which 
had enveloped her proved to be fatal. Though her claims that almost 20,000 
voters in Starehe were from her flock are no doubt exaggerated, they underline 
her church followers’ role in her 2007 success (Kareithi, Amos. 2006. “Bishop 
Wanjiru Hopes to Be President.” The Standard, 5 November. http://allafrica.com/
stories/200611060988.html). In January 2013, shortly before the election, she said 
from the pulpit that, “if you do not know who to vote for, call the numbers on the 
screen and we will tell you who to vote for” (JIAM morning service, 13 January 
2013). See Gez & Alvis (2015).
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religious world” (Anderson 2004, 280), and the absence of any centralised 
institutional structure further heightens the appeal of individual initiatives. 
Today, it is common to hear the inhabitants of Nairobi make remarks such 
as, “to become a pastor nowadays, all you need is a Bible and a suit.” Under 
such conditions, it is not surprising that Pentecostalism’s social and political 
long-term impact remains uncertain.
3. Churches and the Pluralist Elections
Since the return of a multi-party political system in 1991, each of the 
six general elections that have been held have revealed a different state 
of Kenyan civil society (Droz & Maupeu 2013; Maupeu 1998). In the late 
1980s, a number of civil society actors criticised the repression of Moi’s 
dictatorial regime and its totalitarian inclinations: tight control of the 
corps intermédiaires (political parties, trade unions, employers, etc.), rising 
numbers of political prisoners, political persecution, and surveillance. In 
the elections of 1988, a new voting process that required voters to line up 
behind their candidate, and the marginalisation of certain ethnic groups, 
shocked many high-profile civil society leaders. Some ministers stood up 
against these trends and criticised the voting system. In close collaboration 
with human rights lawyers, they backed the politicians persecuted for 
demanding free, multi-party elections. Following intense international 
pressure, President Moi—who threatened that ethnic unrest would befall the 
country following the abandonment of the single-party system—authorised 
new political parties, which were created under the patronage of the main 
Churches. During this period, the opposition party utilised religious 
establishments and disseminated its messages through Christian networks. 
But the political class quickly sought to free itself of this religious tutelage, 
and during the electoral campaign of 1992, the clergy was ostensibly left 
aside. Despite its divisions, the opposition was confident about winning 
the elections. However, the re-election of President Moi and the decisive 
victory of his party forced the opposition politicians to reconsider their 
strategy, and their means for expanding their electoral base.
In 1992 and 1993, the main churches worked to accommodate almost 
one hundred thousand refugees fleeing massacres in the Rift Valley. These 
ethnic cleansings were denied by the authorities, who were complicit in 
(if not the actual authors of) the killings (Maupeu 1997). The state and 
the ruling elite ignored the dramatic situation in the Rift Valley, while 
the administration hindered the relief efforts of Christian organisations. 
During this humanitarian crisis, the opposition unconvincingly denounced 
the massacres, creating a rupture between the political class, religious 
forces, and human rights NGOs. Five years later, human rights associations 
dictated the agenda and the themes of the electoral campaign of 1997. 
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As early as 1996, some activists mobilised a diverse public to propose a 
reform of the Constitution. Many Protestant and Catholic opinion leaders 
supported the constitutional reform from the ground up. Nevertheless, 
these attempts were unsuccessful and only superficial modifications were 
introduced to the Constitution, tailor-made to favour President Moi’s re-
election in 1997.
The same year, the opposition organised huge demonstrations in order to 
demand a change to the Constitution before the elections. Convinced by the 
success of these mobilisations, an ailing opposition attempted to recapture 
some of the momentum that had been generated. Once again, politicians 
joined the opposition party, working with the Catholic and Protestant 
Churches. However, six months before the vote, the demonstrations 
escalated due to increased police persecution, and demonstrators were 
beaten inside the Anglican Cathedral in Nairobi. Faced with the number of 
casualties and the risk of anarchy, the clergy and several opposition leaders 
negotiated with the authorities, further marginalising the leaders of the 
social movement. As a result, Christian organisations have long alienated 
human rights NGOs and many lawyers (Maupeu 2001).
In 2002, the Churches hardly appeared in the national electoral campaign. 
Most of them supported the opposition, but their commitment was mostly 
felt at the local level, where they organised the primary round of voting 
for certain parties and endorsed their candidates at religious ceremonies. 
Thus, with the exception of the AIC22 and some Pentecostal movements, the 
Christians strongly supported Mr Kibaki and his party, whose victory was 
also theirs. The new regime cleverly appointed several high-ranking clergy 
members to committees which were essentially well-paid sinecures. Hence, 
these leaders did not look for a reason to criticise the new governmental 
team (Maupeu, Musambayi & Mitullah 2005).
In the 2005 constitutional referendum, the churches uncritically defended 
the modification of the country’s constitution, which were swept away by 
the voters. In the 2007 elections, the Catholic elite ostensibly supported 
the re-election of Mwai Kibaki. The National Council of Churches of 
Kenya (NCCK), which acts as the umbrella organisation for the country’s 
Protestant Churches, seemed to lose its neutrality when its leader ran in the 
legislative elections under the banner of the President’s party. Furthermore, 
many religious leaders, particularly among the Pentecostals, decided to 
enter the race for a seat in Parliament, encouraged by the rejection of the 
2005 draft of the Constitution (Cheeseman 2008; Kavulla 2008; Gez & Alvis 
2015; Gifford 2009; Droz & Maupeu 2013). Thus, the 2007—as well as the 
2013—elections saw a tidal wave of Pentecostal candidates, many of whom 
22. The African Inland Church broke away from an evangelical mission 
originated in the East Coast of the United States.
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came from neo-Pentecostal currents, which preach involvement in world 
affairs and advocate entrepreneurship through their theology of prosperity. 
In 2010, a new version of the Constitution was submitted for referendum 
and was eventually accepted. However, heated debates on the religious 
issues addressed in the Constitution draft—like the legalisation of abortion 
and the autonomous status of the Khadi Courts for the Muslims of Kenya—
underlined the influence of the Christian lobby (Osur 2011).
The elections of 2013 raised fears of a recurrence of the 2008 post-
electoral violence that had inflamed the whole country and left more 
than 1,500 dead. Back then, some religious leaders had played incendiary 
roles by violently supporting their own candidate and fuelling tensions 
between different communities, showing that the churches had grievously 
failed to play their role as peacemaker. Having largely learned from these 
tragic events, they developed programmes to promote national unity and 
to successfully prevent future violence. For example, many ecumenical 
prayer meetings were organised and widely reported in the media. In an 
interfaith meeting broadcast on television, Bishop David Oginde of the 
Nairobi Pentecostal Church (NPC) pointed out that the use of churches as 
electoral stepping-stones by politicians had been sharply curtailed: “If you 
compare this year with the 2007 [elections] for example, you hardly notice 
any church group or any church leader that are praying for, endorsing 
any particular candidates. […] We had a meeting and we agreed [that] we 
pray generally for the elections to be peaceful, we pray for our members 
who are campaigning that God may go before them, but that is [a] general 
prayer” (Citizen TV, 16 February 2013). Nevertheless, the effectiveness of 
these measures is still open to question, given that the forum of Muslim 
chiefs supported the candidacy of Raila Odinga, while Uhuru Kenyatta was 
backed by the association of Muslim organisations.23
The latest elections in 2017, which saw Uhuru Kenyatta’s victory in the 
first round of voting, did not give rise to much public intervention from the 
churches, contrary to what we have seen in previous elections.24
4. Religious Butinage in Kenya
We met Charles in August 2014, near Kisumu on the shores of Lake Victoria 
in Western Kenya. At thirty years old, he was living with his wife, and their 
three children. His parents, both members of Legio Maria (Kustenbauder 
23. Alongside the commitment of the historic churches in electoral politics, 
other religious forces played an influential role, such as neo-traditionalist 
religious movements.
24. Perhaps we can see here the results of the ecumenism created by religious 
butinage. See Droz & Gez (2019).
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2009)—his mother, a born catholic, had to convert in order to marry her 
husband—brought him to Kisumu at a young age. His birth was difficult 
and considered as a miracle brought about by the prayers of the members 
of Legio Maria. His mother was admonished that Charles “at all times 
should be in Legio, should not walk out of Legio.” He remained in this 
denomination for many years, becoming a devout “mass child.” However, as 
the demands of his church his church precluded him from studying, he left 
it in secondary school. But his life was not easy—he passed from odd job to 
odd job, and his house was burgled. For his family, all these troubles were 
the result of him leaving Legio Maria, in contravention of the prophecy 
of his birth. They attempted in vain to convince Charles to return to their 
church. But his woes did not end there. Charles suffered several accidents 
before meeting a young Luo man in a park in Mombasa, who invited him to 
join his small Pentecostal church. Although he really enjoyed this church 
for a while, Charles became exasperated by the political turn the sermons 
took before the 2007 elections. He left this church and returned to Kisumu.
He then approached another church, Deliverance Church, but soon left it 
following institutional quarrels (the central leadership accused its Kisumu 
branch of siphoning off money from the tithe) in order to join another 
Pentecostal denomination led by a white reverend. However, the reverend 
asked him to testify on his behalf before the police, which irritated Charles: 
“I’m sorry for this, [but] one of my objectives of coming to church was to 
pray, not to do [court] cases. I’m sorry, I’m not coming to that.” After some 
time, the institutional quarrel was resolved, and Charles’ wife, as well as his 
children, returned to Deliverance Church where they remain today.
Thinking of the succession of misfortunes that had befallen him, Charles 
admits that he sometimes believed that he was cursed by members of his 
family. In fact, Charles dreaded returning to his home village for fear of 
witchcraft. He explained that he would never go to consult a witchdoctor 
for help, but he admitted to having asked a preacher to pray for him, in 
order to protect him from spells, with little success. He complained of false 
preachers, of the many preachers who divert money from the Church or 
who take advantage of their congregation. Nevertheless, he insisted that 
“back in the day,” the members of Legio Maria were truly animated by the 
Holy Spirit: “We the people, we’ve walked away from God. People [today] 
want to do their things, there is despair, desperate, we want money, and the 
people who know God’s matter, people who are eloquent, who understand 
God’s word, they also seem to take advantage of the same, just to extort 
money from the people.” Charles feels demoralised by the attitudes of 
today’s pastors and admits to not having attended church in more than a 
year. Before that, he visited several denominations, including the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, without remaining at any for long. He now says he is drawn to 
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Catholicism, having enjoyed the Catholic services he attended in Mombasa 
with his maternal uncle. However, he has clashed with his wife over this, 
as she remains deeply committed to Deliverance Church. Having recently 
bought a television set, he spends his Sunday mornings “church zapping”—
that is, channel-hopping from one religious station to another.
How can we understand a story like Charles’, so varied and yet not 
unfamiliar to the people of Kenya? Statistics tell us a part of the story. 
According to the most recent census data from 2019, Kenya’s population 
of 47.6 million consists of 85.5% Christian (33.5% Protestant, 20.6% Catholic 
and 20.4% Evangelical) and 11% Muslims. The census respondents had to 
choose a single response out of the eight provided, though we observe 
that it is common for many people to participate in the services of 
several denominations. Of course, the census did not consider the degree 
of involvement in religious services either: is it a formal and recognised 
affiliation, a constant participation in a religious service without formal 
affiliation, an episodic participation, or an occasional visit? Finally, knowing 
that in Kenya it is frowned upon not to declare a religious affiliation, it is 
highly possible that respondents claimed an affiliation even if it is barely, 
if at all, practised. In this respect, it is noteworthy that almost a million 
Kenyans still affirm an absence of religion affiliation.
Nevertheless, though religious identity is strongly influenced by 
religious institutions, it is not limited to them. Religious identities in 
Kenya are polymorphous and highly variable. Social science researchers 
have demonstrated—by evoking the concept of “lived religion” (Hall 1997; 
McGuire 2008; Roof 2001)—that religious practices transcend institutional 
boundaries. For their part, Kenyans often declare that “God is one” and 
that religious practices depend on personal preferences or pragmatic and 
contextual considerations, insofar as they keep to the realm of Christianity. 
In her master’s thesis, Elisabeth Wafula (2003, 106-107), a Kenyan, states:
Previously, people attended a Church because of their loyalty to the 
congregation. Even if the Church was not ministering to their needs, they 
remained because of their sense of duty. Nowadays, people hop from Church 
to Church depending on their particular needs and available programs within 
the Church which minister to their needs. Their identity within the Church 
is nolonger [sic] based upon the past, but upon the contributions the Church 
makes on their lives and families. This has indeed brought pressure upon most 
Churches to develop multiple ministries resulting into inter-denomination 
[sic] mobility.25
25. Wafula’s thesis relies on the results of the study done by the Nairobi Urban 
Integration Research Project. The data were collected in the early 2000s from 
1,535 people in Nairobi. 457 among them (30%) claimed to have changed religious 
denomination at least once since birth.
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A more refined approach to religious identities in Kenya, such as Charles’, 
therefore requires acknowledging a relative fluidity of participation in 
religious services, as well as a significant mobility of affiliations, both at 
present, as Wafula indicates, and likely also in the past (Neckebrouck 1978; 
1983; Peterson 1996; 2000; Chanson, Droz, Gez & Soares 2014). Kenyans can 
adopt a denomination that they consider to be the core of their affiliation, 
while maintaining more “peripheral” links to other religious forms, and 
can equally participate in circular religious mobility, or go back and forth 
between churches.
It is therefore possible in Kenya to distinguish between “visits” to 
religious services and affiliation to a church. This distinction highlights 
the possibility of combining simultaneous engagement in different forms 
of participation in religious services with the existence of a hierarchical 
difference between them. The affiliation remains at the heart of belonging to 
a faith, both declared and experienced, while visits represent a “secondary,” 
often exploratory, form of participation. They are generally institutionalised 
and often follow an established protocol (Gez & Droz 2017). Nevertheless, 
such mobility can turn into “church hopping,” a notion describing a person’s 
lack of stable affiliation as a solid primary affiliation is not maintained. An 
individual may be suspected of changing affiliation to create dissension 
or to seek financial or sexual interests. Some, like Charles, prudently limit 
their participation in religious services and stay at home to watch the 
ceremonies of various Christian television programmes, or to follow the 
virtual “crusades” of the televangelists, and consequently are less involved 
in “church hopping” than they are in “church zapping.” For example, a 
Kenyan journalist presents the story of a lady called Christine Ndegwa, 
“a Christian who prefers watching sermons on television to attending 
church.” Ndegwa explains her preferences by alluding to discontent with 
contemporary pastors, who she sees as living a lavish, immoral lifestyle, 
while their congregations languish in poverty. During our research in 
Nairobi, we heard several people give similar examples. In Kenya, there are 
many religious television channels such as Family TV, and international 
religious stations are equally available. Some religious programmes also 
broadcast on private channels. While “church zapping” could come from 
disillusionment with today’s preachers, it could also be a means of coping 
with the demands of wage employment, as waiters or receptionists who 
work on Sundays can also “participate” in religious services, just like taxis 
drivers who listen to these radio programmes while on the road.26
26. Okeyo, Verah. 2013. “Preaching to the Converted: The Rise of Atheism in 
Modern Kenya.” Daily Nation—DN2, 3 July: 2-3. https://nation.africa/kenya/life-
and-style/dn2/the-rise-of-atheism-in-modern-kenya-872868 [archive].
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Such observations emphasise that taking religious practices into account 
requires us to go beyond the “theological” notion of a singular religious 
affiliation, which suggests a strict adherence to explicit institutional 
prescriptions. Rather, the concept of “religious butinage” (named after the 
French term for the foraging movement of bees while gathering pollen) 
makes it possible for us to account for these fluid and varied religious 
practices. To discuss religious butinage is also to examine the social practices 
and the “manières de faire” (“ways of doing,” de Certeau 1980) within the 
religious field, and to thus document religious practices that too often go 
unnoticed: switching from one denomination to another, participating in 
several churches at once without formally adhering to any one, partaking 
in prayer circles that bring together practitioners of various denominations, 
channel-hopping between televised sermons, etc. The Abrahamic religions 
offer a representation of the religious and of religious practices that favours 
the dichotomy between believers and unbelievers. Any view to the contrary 
is perceived as a deviation from orthodoxy. However, religious butinage’s 
manière de faire acknowledges the everyday mobility of the practitioner as 
irreducible to institutional prescriptions.
The practice of religious butinage takes religion into account as a 
practice of (re)production of social relations (neighbourhood, friendships, 
etc.) but also of meaning. The practice of butinage may thus be interpreted 
as allowing Kenyans to accumulate religious resources that offer them 
certain securities in the face of the ever-changing field of religion—in 
which schisms, collapses, and fusions of religious movements are frequent, 
as are suspicions of abuse of power by religious dignitaries (Droz 1997; 
Gez & Droz 2015). Religious butinage, or multiple practices, allows for 
diverse ways of worship to be preserved in case one’s primary, or initial, 
denomination descends into political or financial scandal, or an individual’s 
religious identity transforms in light of lived experience such as geographic 
mobility. Religious identity is in a constant process of renegotiation.
Speaking of religious butinage also takes into account the entanglement 
of the religious world with the secular one (Soares 2009; Soares, Droz & 
Gez 2012; Droz, Soares & Oro 2014; Droz, Soares, Gez & Rey 2016; Droz 
& Gez 2019). Consequently, in order to avoid seeing their followers stray 
into the sins of popular entertainment (alcohol, sex, disco, cinema, etc.), 
the Christian churches offer religious services that are sometimes akin to a 
“show” with musical and theatrical production values on par with those of 
professional performers.
Emphasising the blending of the secular and the religious allows us to 
show that the latter is not only a place of spiritual engagement, but also a 
place of socialisation, recreation, and pleasure (Bayart 2014). Many of our 
interlocutors remarked that the Sunday religious services are very engaging 
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and that they take pleasure in going because the church is “where things 
happen.” Additionally, for the many inhabitants of Nairobi with limited 
financial resources, the leisure activities offered by the capital remain 
inaccessible, meaning that religious services are also seen as an affordable 
entertainment and a way to “pass the time.”
Conclusion
Since colonisation, Christian churches in Kenya have helped to make 
sense of a world in constant upheaval by offering opportunities for 
social advancement, through education or politics, and by achieving (at 
least partially) some of their promises of development (Droz 2016). This 
chapter has highlighted the range of perspectives taken by established 
religious denominations, first in the face of British powers and later under 
independent rule. The country’s religious leadership played sometimes-
contradictory roles confronting the ruling power, before engaging in the 
game of representative democracy during the 2007 and 2013 elections at the 
risk of losing their independence.
This commitment to secular politics was further reinforced by the 
establishment of numerous Pentecostal churches. New religious movements 
(whether they represent independent African churches emerging out 
of missionary churches or Pentecostal movements) have profoundly 
transformed the religious landscape of Kenya. In recent years, the wave of 
neo-Pentecostalism and missionary work (mostly by American preachers) 
has further intensified this process. So much so that, according to a Kenyan 
journalist, “From the 1970s to date, what was and what is are now worlds 
apart.”27 These changes can be seen in the “Pentecostalisation” of Kenyan 
Christianity, to the extent that Pentecostal teachings are today shared by 
many established churches.
But outside the institutional confines of Kenyan religious forms, 
it appears that the “faithful” are much more than that: their religious 
commitments, whether visiting other churches or their primary religious 
affiliation, transcend institutionalised identities and practices. Kenyans like 
Charles move freely within the religious landscape to build their often-
polymorphic and composite religious identities. The study of religious 
denominations should therefore not be limited to institutional dynamics 
such as the political actions of the church and their official discourses. 
Research should equally take into account the social norms and actual 
practices of the congregants, who oscillate between their primary religious 
27. Oduor, Peter. 2013. “The Kenyan Church and the Gospel of Prosperity.” Daily 
Nation—DN2, 13  February: 2-3. https://nation.africa/kenya/life-and-style/dn2/
the-kenyan-church-and-the-gospel-of-prosperity--847652 [archive]. 
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affiliation and multiple visits, not to mention the practice of “religious 
butinage” or “church zapping” on television. The dynamics of these practices 
go beyond the institutional prescriptions and offer a new research horizon 
for analysing religious practices in Kenya and elsewhere.
If we attempt to predict the future of these institutional, personal, 
and political religious dynamics, one might evoke the relatively recent 
emergence of questions about the possibility of no longer affiliating with 
any single church, or recognise the absence of commitment to a religion. 
Even if statistics are not very reliable, Kenyans have a sense that “the 
number of families who have no affiliation with any religion is growing.”28 
Some have argued that this tendency could be explained by the appearance 
of a middle class, whose higher rates of education promotes a “scientific” 
representation of the world and a critical spirit, reinforced by access to new 
means of electronic communication.29 Moreover, this trend might equally 
be associated with the numerous scandals that affected multiple religious 
leaders and their churches. This caused a certain disillusionment affecting 
church leaders and self-proclaimed prophets, who are overly preoccupied 
by very secular things: money, sex and power. Whatever this trend means 
and wherever its supposed causes may lie, it underlines the intense 
mobility—of religion, politics, or identity—within the religious landscape of 
Kenya, and its members.
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